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OVERBROAD CIVIL FORFEITURE STATUTES ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE'
DEBORAH DUSEAU*

& DAVID SCHOENBROD'

I. INTRODUCTION

Eager to lock up Dan the drug dealer, the police tell his neighbor,
Sarah, to spy on him. Sarah has taken no part in Dan's criminal activity.
In fact, she has told her fifteen-year-old son, who hangs out on the front
steps of her home, that he should not even speak to Dan. Dan slips the
lad a few bucks now and then for calling out when a police cruiser is
about to roll by during drug deals. When Sarah refuses to do the police's
bidding, the prosecutor seizes her home under a statute that authorizes
forfeiture of "[a]ll real property . . . which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,
a violation of this subchapter."'
Sarah may bring an action to get her home back, but will succeed only
if she can show that her property does not meet this broad description or
that the crime was "committed... without [her] knowledge or consent
....
2 She would likely lose. A crime was committed, her front steps
were a lookout, she knew of the crime and might have done more to stop
it. Moreover, under some state civil forfeiture statutes, even less
protection is afforded owners, and Sarah could lose her home even if she
had no knowledge that any crime was being committed.3
Prosecutors defend civil forfeitures by pointing out that, typically,
they are less outrageous than that of Sarah's home. 4 This is insufficient
* Copyright by Deborah Duseau and David Schoenbrod 1994.
** J.D., 1994, New York Law School
*** Professor of Law, New York Law School.

1. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN., tit. 24, § 2512(a)(4), (b) (1979) (lacking an express
innocent-owner defense).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Boeing 707 Aircraft, 750 F.2d 1280 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985) (permitting forfeiture of weapons and one Boeing 707
which were directly involved in an illegal attempt to export arms without a proper
license); United States v. 5.935 Acres of Land, 752 F. Supp. 359 (D. Haw. 1990)
(finding that forfeiture of the defendants' land was appropriate because defendants were
convicted of growing and distributing marijuana on that parcel of land); United States v.
Lot 4, Block 5 of the Eaton Acres, 712 F. Supp. 810 (D. Or. 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d 487
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding real property used in actual delivery of cocaine was subject to
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comfort for two reasons.
First, civil forfeiture statutes are
unconstitutionally overbroad. Although the typical forfeiture case would
involve Dan's drugs, guns, and profits rather than Sarah's home, many
cases are not so typical. The authorities may attempt to seize her property
solely because she refused to cooperate in their investigation because they
suspect her of some crime for which they cannot charge her, or simply to
raise money for their departmental budget.5 The court may decide not to
return her property if it fits the statute's broad definition of forfeitable
property. In our view, civil forfeiture statutes are unconstitutionally
overbroad because, in many cases, they authorize taking property without
just compensation in violation of the Takings and Due Process clauses of
the Fifth Amendment and impose excessive fines in violation of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.
Second, and more important, civil forfeiture statutes are
unconstitutionally vague. This vagueness is important not only in the
atypical cases such as Sarah's, but also in more common cases because
police and prosecutors have broad discretion to decide which property to
seize, and owners lack notice of the operational limits on forfeiture.
The overbreadth and vagueness points are related. Because courts
limit the overbreadth of civil forfeiture statutes in a piecemeal fashion, the
statutes, as written and interpreted, fail to provide sufficient notice of what
conduct is prohibited. As a result, the statutes are unconstitutionally
vague.
There are four ways to prevent statutes from being
unconstitutionally overbroad. First and ideally, the statute itself could
establish generally applicable limits that are consistent with the
Constitution. Second, if a broad construction of the statute makes it
overbroad, the courts could interpret it narrowly to establish generally
applicable limits that are consistent with the Constitution. Third, if the
statute cannot be interpreted to avoid violations, the courts could strike it
down as unconstitutional. Fourth, the courts could let the statute stand,
and deal with constitutional violations case by case, either through ad hoc
civil forfeiture). But cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974) (allowing forfeiture of a yacht valued at $19,800 on which one marijuana cigarette
was discovered although the yacht's owners were neither involved in nor aware of the
lessee's unlawful use of their yacht).
5. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 502 n.2
(1993) (excerpting a 1990 memo from the Attorney General to United States Attorneys
urging an increase in the volume of forfeiture cases in order to meet the amount targeted
in the budget); see also David Heilbroner, The Law Goes on a Treasure Hunt, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 70.
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statutory interpretation or findings of unconstitutionality. 6 The fourth
approach is the path courts have taken with civil forfeiture, and it is this
approach that creates vagueness. 7
Legislatures have written the forfeiture statutes in the broadest terms
politically conceivable. Congress has said that all property that can
constitutionally be seized is subject to forfeiture. 8 When confronted with
hypotheticals, such as Sarah's, which demonstrates that the statutes allow
seizures that can be characterized as takings or excessive fines, courts do
not strike down the statutes but rather consider the overbreadth challenges
ad hoc.9 As a result, it is only a mild exaggeration to say that
legislatures have written the statutes, and courts have interpreted them, to
permit forfeiture of all property that the government can lay its hands on,
subject to constitutional limitations. These limits are specified case by
case.
When interpreted in this fashion, the statutes are not
unconstitutionally overbroad but they are unconstitutionally vague. Even
the courts are in great doubts about the parameters of the Takings and
Excessive Fines clauses. The statutes fail to give ordinary people notice
of what conduct is prohibited, nor do they provide adequate guidance for
law enforcement personnel in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.
Civil forfeiture statutes most commonly are analyzed in terms of the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause and the Fifth Amendment's
6. See, e.g., United States v. Ford CoupeAuto., 272 U.S. 321,333 (1926) (relying
on J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921) in refraining
from striking down a forfeiture statute based on potential but unargued claims).
7. See infra notes 83-116 and accompanying text.
8. Congress' motivation in authorizing forfeiture of certain kinds of property shows
the far-reaching and punitive nature of 21 U.S.C. § 881. It is the intent of these

provisions to authorize forfeiture of property "if such property is used, or intended for
use, in the manufacture or distribution of illegal drugs or used or intended to be used to
facilitate certain violations of the Act."

See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522.

Furthermore, a congressional panel reviewing the purpose of the 1984 amendments to
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 noted that few in
Congress or law enforcement "fail to recognize that the traditional sanctions of fine and
imprisonment are inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable [drug] trade
. . . which is plaguing the country .... [Florfeiture is the mechanism through which
such an attack may be made." 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 8182, 3374; see also United States
v. 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1977) (identifying the
"[c]ongressional concern [over] rising drug trafficking in this country and its conviction
that those who profit and thrive upon the misery of drug addicts should be punished
financially by forfeiture").
9. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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Takings and Due Process clauses, but not for vagueness. 10 Although
litigants have occasionally raised this claim, courts have either
misunderstood the vagueness claim as an attack on the vagueness of the
underlying criminal statute that predicated the forfeiture rather than an
attack on the vagueness of the forfeiture statute itself, or rejected the claim
with little or no analysis." These courts reject the vagueness challenge
on the basis that the crime is clearly and specifically defined and, thus,
provides adequate notice of the underlying crime and its possible
punishments. 2 However, the notice provided by criminal statutes to
criminal defendants does not notify non-criminal property owners, such as
Sarah, that their property may be forfeited. Still other courts reject the
vagueness claim on the basis that, regardless of whether the criminal
statute is vague, conviction for the crime is not necessary for forfeiture.13
Part II of this article identifies three narrow justifications for forfeiture

of property that are consistent with the Constitution and shows that two
much broader justifications relied upon by prosecutors to support
forfeiture statutes cannot be squared with constitutional protections. The
results demonstrate that civil forfeiture statutes are overbroad. 4 Part m
10. See, e.g., Steven L. Kessler, Forfeitureand the Eighth Amendment, N.Y. L.J.,
July 26, 1993, at 1 (finding that only recently have courts expanded their analysis of
forfeiture statutes to criticize the disproportionately punitive nature of civil forfeiture
statutes because the previous rationale of punishing "nameless, faceless drug dealers who
have no rights anyway" does not support the required nexus between the financial
relationship of the property forfeited to the underlying criminal activity). See also
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989);
United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Walsh, 700
F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1990); United
States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564
(10th Cir. 1984); United States v. 1606 Butterfield Rd., 786 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Iowa
1991); United States v. 26.075 Acres, More or Less, 687 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.N.C.
1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 866 F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989); Windfaire, Inc.
v. Busbee, 523 F. Supp. 868 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
12. See, e.g., Windfaire, Inc., 523 F. Supp. at 872; United States v. Boffa, 513 F.
Supp. 444, 457-58 (D. Del. 1980). But see Steven L. Kessler, Tide is Turning in
FederalForfeitureRulings, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 5, 1993, at 1 (reasoning from recent court
opinions that it may no longer be enough to say that the defendant is a criminal and
should have known better before subjecting his property to forfeiture proceedings). Of
course, any vagueness in the underlying criminal statute would necessarily create
vagueness in the corresponding forfeiture statute.
13. See, e.g., United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 733 (C.D.
Cal. 1994).
14. See infra notes 16-81 and accompanying text.
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explains that the overbreadth in the forfeiture statutes leads to
unconstitutional vagueness. '5

II. CrviL FORFEITURE STATUTES ARE OvERBROAD
A. A Fresh Look at the Takings Issue
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no "private
property [shall] be taken . . . without just compensation." 16
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
takings without just compensation are unconstitutional.' 1 However, civil
forfeiture actions are an exception to this line of cases. Accordingly, we
consider under what circumstances forfeiture can be reconciled with the
general principles of takings law.
First, we identify and discuss three justifications that are consistent
with constitutional principles: (1) forfeiture of contraband; (2) forfeiture
of fruits of the crime; and (3) forfeiture to punish violators. Next, we
consider two purported justifications for forfeiture that are inconsistent
with the constitutional principles of due process and the taking of
property: (1) that the property forfeited is an instrument of death and (2)
that the property is the instrument of crime. This discussion presents
those justifications which are consistent with the Constitution and those
which are not.
1. Legitimate Rationales for Forfeiture
a. Contraband
The forfeiture of contraband, such as illegal drugs, is not a taking of
property because contraband, by definition, is not supposed to be
owned. 8 Sarah's home cannot be considered contraband. Although
contraband is defined by the legislature, a legislature could not readily say
15. See infra notes 82-125 and accompanying text.

16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v.
Delaware& Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366 (1909); Ewing v. City of St. Louis, 72 U.S. 413

(1866).
18. The United States Supreme Court has defined contraband as "objects the
possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime." 1958 Plymouth Sedan v.
Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965). Further, public policy dictates that the owner
has no right to have the contraband returned. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 52-53 (1951) (defining contraband goods as those in which Congress has

declared no property rights exist).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

her home is contraband.19 A statute declaring homes such as Sarah's to
be contraband would be unconstitutional.
Regulations generally may not completely deprive an owner of a
property's value unless that property is a nuisance.'
Moreover, a
legislative determination declaring a particular class of property to be
contraband would infuriate all owners of that class of property. Thus,
Sarah would have many allies in the political process with whom to fight
such legislation.

b. Fruits of the Crime
The forfeiture of fruits of the crime-for example, proceeds from the
sale of drugs or profits from fraud-is not a taking of property because
these proceeds are "unjust enrichment" under the law of restitution.2"

Under the "fruits of the crime" doctrine, the criminal actor may not
benefit from illegal activity; therefore, proceeds are forfeited to return the
criminal to the position he was in before committing the crime.
Following this logic, the forfeiture of Sarah's home cannot be justified
as depriving her of the fruits of a crime. Sarah's ownership of her house

was not a proceed of any illegal activity.
c. Punishing Violators

Forfeiture of property owned by a lawbreaker is not considered a
taking when it is punishment for the violation.'

If the violation is

deemed criminal, then the government must show beyond a reasonable
doubt that the owner violated the law. In addition to criminal punishment,
19. See United States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1979). The court stated
that the law recognizes two categories of contraband. Id. at 1344. First, traditional or
per se contraband is defined as "objects the possession of which, without more,
constitutes a crime." Id. (citing 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693,
699 (1965)). Second, derivative contraband includes "articles which are not inherently
illegal, but are used in an unlawful manner." Id. (quoting People v. Steskal, 302 N.E.2d
321 (Il. 1973)) (footnote omitted).
For examples of state statutes defining contraband, see MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.531(e) (West 1987) (defining "contraband property" as "property which is illegal to
possess under Minnesota law"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28-5.06 (1989) (defining
contraband as "[a]ll controlled substances which may be handled, sold, possessed, or
distributed in violations of any of the provisions of this chapter").
20. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
21. GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrrTUON § 23.1, at 342-45 (1978).
22. See, e.g., Steven L. Kessler, Protectingthe Homesteadfirom Forfeiture,N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 14, 1994, at 1, 4 (asserting that forfeiture is permissible because the law
provides for punishment of persons convicted of illegal activity).
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the Supreme Court has also allowed the government to impose civil
punishments.' In prosecuting civil offenses, the government need only

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner violated the
law.' Paradoxically, most civil forfeiture statutes do not require the
government to shoulder the burden of proving a violation. To the
contrary, they require the owner to prove her innocence.' Using the
concept of civil punishment to justify forfeiture without proving the owner

committed a civil offense violates the Due Process Clause. The violation
can be cured, however, by placing the initial burden of proof on the
government.2
2. Illegitimate Rationales for Forfeiture
In addition to the three legitimate rationales for forfeiture, law
enforcement officials and the courts rely upon other rationales that cannot
be squared with general principles of the Takings Clause or due process.
a. Instruments of Death

At early common law, inanimate objects that caused death (called
"deodands") were forfeited to the king on the theory that the instrument

itself was guilty of the crime. The king, it was said, would expiate that
guilt by providing money for Masses held for the good of the victim's
soul. Modem courts confirm that the deodand never became part of the
common law of the United States.' Nonetheless, courts repeatedly refer
23. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989).
24. See Ramseyv. United Mine Workers of Am., 401 U.S. 302, 308 (1971) (noting
that the usual rule of evidence applicable to civil actions in federal court is that of
preponderance of evidence).
25. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) ("no property shall be forfeited . . . by
reason of any act... established by that owner to have been committed... without
[iis] knowledge [or] consent. . . .") (emphasis added).
26. See Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla.
1991). The court held that the state bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing
evidence at trial because of the significance of the constitutionally protected rights at
issue. Id. at 967. The court reasoned that, in forfeiture proceedings, the "state impinges
on basic constitutional rights of individuals who may never have been formally charged,"
and therefore the state must carry the burden of proof. Id.
27. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682
(1974).
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to the theory of the deodand to justify forfeiture.' This judicial reliance
on the deodand is misplaced.
As in Sarah's case, most forfeited property is not an instrument of
death.' Even if Sarah's front steps were thought to be an instrument of
death in some indirect sense, imputing guilt to an object is silly animism.
Such animism once served a purpose that was not so silly. As Oliver
Wendell Holmes pointed out, the deodand theory sheltered people from
the repulsion generally felt towards true instruments of death-for
example, a knife that was plunged into someone's back.' Few people
could bear the thought of pulling the knife out, washing it off, and using
it to make dinner. But, modem forfeiture does not serve the purpose of
protecting us from such repulsion. Today, rather than offering the
instrument to God and holding Masses to benefit the victim's soul, the
instruments of death are kept in the police evidence room. No expiation
from guilt occurs for the general public. Instead, modem forfeiture serves
the purpose of enriching the state. Enriching the state without more,
however, does not justify taking private property.
b. Instruments of Crime
Courts sometimes justify forfeiture on the basis that it prevents the use
of instruments of crime. After all, no one has a constitutionally protected
right to use property to harm others.3 This rationale would support
28. See, e.g., United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 71920 (1971) (stating that "modem forfeiture statutes are direct descendants of [the deodand]
heritage"); United States v. Securities That Represent Robbins' Interest, No. 87 CV.
2544 (RJD) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1987), at 14 (explaining that the concept of deodands
was adopted through forfeiture statutes to serve a deterrent function); United States v.
One Parcel of Real Estate, 675 F. Supp. 645 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (asserting that the theory
of the deodand is appropriate in an action seeking forfeiture of property that is proceeds
of illegal activity).
29. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663 (property forfeited was a pleasure
yacht); United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(property forfeited was the claimant's house.)
30. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 24-30 (Mark D. Howe ed.,

Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
31. The legal maxim underlying much of modem nuisance law is sic utere tuo ut
alienwn non laedas, literally meaning "one should use his own property in such a manner
as not to injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990); see

also Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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forfeiting property that has no non-contrived legitimate use.32 So
limited, the rationale justifies forfeiture of contraband. It does not,
however, justify forfeiture of property that has non-criminal, or legitimate,

uses. But, most forfeiture is of property not peculiarly suited to crime,
such as real estate, automobiles, and even Sarah's home.

Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion in Austin v. United States,'
argued that postal scales, even those made of gold that are used to commit
crimes, could be seized as instruments of crime no matter what their value
However, his analysis emphasizes only the
or non-criminal use.'

relationship between the property seized and the crime committed within

the limits of the Excessive Fines Clause.' 5 Justice Scalia did not address

whether the forfeiture is a taking, especially when the owner is not a
proven violator.
Of course, people can be restrained from the improper use of property
that has legitimate uses. For example, if the owner of a baseball bat used

it to menace others, a court could enjoin the owner to stop the menacing
behavior or to stop carrying the bat. If the owner could not be trusted to
comply, she could be ordered to relinquish possession of the bat. But
because the injunction can go no further than needed to put the owner in
her rightful position,' it could not order her to surrender the bat to the
state. Moreover, the party seeking the injunction had satisfied the burden
of proving that the owner used or threatened to use the bat in a dangerous
way. However, in the case of forfeiture, no such burden of proof is
32. See, e.g., Stallone v. Abrams, 584 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 1992)
(upholding forfeiture of items that have no non-contrived legitimate use because they
come within the core meaning of the statute authorizing forfeiture of equipment that can
be used in "dispensing or administering a controlled substance," N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 3387(3) (McKinney 1993)).
33. 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812-15 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
34. Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(pointing out that statutory in rem forfeitures have been fixed by determining what
property has been tainted by unlawful use, not by assessing the value of the property-the
penalty-in relation to the crime committed).
35. Id. at 2814-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
36. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-86
(1977) (stating that, in protecting First Amendment rights, "It]he constitutional principle
at stake is sufficiently vindicated if [a person] is placed in no worse a position than if he
had not engaged in the [unlawful] conduct"); see also United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 503-04 (1993) (holding that in the usual case, there
is no reason to take the drastic step of asserting control over property when the
government has various other means such as physical limitations (on real property), is
pendens, and restraining orders, to protect its legitimate interests in forfeitable property).
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placed on the prosecution; the element of intent of the owner is absent.
Thus, using forfeiture in this manner is unnecessary and unjustified.
In sum, our fresh look at taldngs principles has identified only three
justifications that reconcile forfeiture with the takings clause: contraband,
fruits of the crime, and punishing violators.
B. Forfeture Statutes Authorize Seizure of Properly That
Is Neither Contraband, Proceeds of a Crime,
Nor Owned by a Proven Violator
State and federal statutes empower prosecutors to seize property when
they can show that (1) a crime occurred and (2) the property was
connected to its commission.3 7 The prosecutor does not have to prove
that the owner committed the crime to obtain forfeiture. Instead, in
defense to the forfeiture proceeding, the owner must prove that she did not
know of the crime or-depending upon the court-in the alternative, that
she did all that she reasonably could to prevent it."
Under such a
statute, if Sarah is unable to fully assert an innocent owner defense, her
property can be forfeited even though it is neither contraband, fruits of a
crime, nor owned by a proven violator.
The gap between forfeitures that are reconcilable with the Takings
Clause and those that are authorized by statute results from two basic
features of the statutes: a broad definition of property that is connected to
the crime and the treatment of the owner's innocence. This gap directly
leads to the overbreadth of civil forfeiture statutes.
1. Connection Between the Property and the Crime
Statutes use broad and imprecise words to indicate which property is
sufficiently connected to a crime to be forfeitable. Typical indications are
that property is forfeitable if it "facilitates the commission of"39 a crime
or "contributes directly and materially to the commission of a crime."'
37. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. &
R. § 1311 (McKinney 1991).
38. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 690 (1974)
(implying that forfeiture could have been avoided had defendant proved that it did all it
reasonably could to avoid the unlawful use of its property).
39. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) ("The following shall be subject to
forfeiture... : [a]ll real property. . . used ..
to facilitate the commission of, a
violation .... .") (emphasis added).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. § 1310(4) (McKinney 1994)
("'Instrumentality of a crime' means any property... whose use contributesdirectly and
materially to the commission of a crime .... ") (emphasis added); MICH. STAT. ANN.
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Such language invokes the concept of instruments of crime, but at the
same time encompasses property that has legitimate uses. Taken literally,

this language includes almost any object owned by a criminal.
Furthermore, it sweeps in property within the vicinity of the crime even
if it is not owned by the criminal, for example, Sarah's home. As a
result, the language used in forfeiture statutes permits overbroad

enforcement.
2. The Innocent Owner Defense
The innocent owner defense is a reaction to the overbreadth of
forfeiture statutes. Traditionally, because forfeiture was justified by the
property's connection to the crime rather than the owner's guilt, the
actions of the owner were irrelevant.' Early courts, therefore, held that
forfeiture of property owned by an innocent person was constitutional.4 2
In response to the harshness of such holdings ' an innocent owner

provision was read into" or added to many of the forfeiture statutes.
The innocent owner defense suggests that forfeitures are justified
under the Takings Clause as punishment of the guilty. But, because the
prosecutor does not have to prove guilt, punishment cannot justify
forfeiture. To the contrary, the owner bears the burden of proving her
innocence.'

Moreover, the innocent owner defense requires the owner

to prove far more than innocence. Some courts interpret the defense as
§ 27A.4701(b) (Callaghan 1993) ('Instrumentality of a crime' means any property
... the use of which contributes directly and materially to the commission ofa crime.")
(emphasis added).
41. United States v. Ford Coupe Auto., 272 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1926); Van Oster
v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465, 468 (1926) (citing J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United
States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1 (1889); Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877); Logan v. United States, 260 F. 746 (5th
Cir. 1919); United States v. One Saxon Auto., 257 F. 251 (4th Cir. 1919); United States
v. Mincey, 254 F. 287 (5th Cir. 1918); United States v. 220 Patented Machs., 99 F. 559

(E.D. Pa. 1900)).
42. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 468.
43. See generally Calero-Toledo,416 U.S. at 689 n.27 (noting that in order to avoid
or mitigate harshness in forfeitures, courts have applied ameliorative policies in handling
forfeitures).
44. Id. at 689 ("It would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner
[w]ho proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful
....
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property .... ").
45. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1988) ("[N]o conveyanceshallbe forfeited
... by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed
without [his] knowledge [or] consent.... .") (emphasis added).
...
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requiring a showing that the owner had no knowledge of the illegal use
and that she did not consent to the illegal use.'
By limiting the
applicability of the innocent owner defense, the courts justify forfeitures
against owners who may have had knowledge of the events but did not
consent to the crime. Therefore, forfeiture statutes allow seizure of
property owned by a non-violator such as Sarah even though she actively
opposed her son's peripheral involvement in the crime.
Other courts make it even harder for innocent owners to defend their
property successfilly. In Calero-Toledo, the Court stated in dicta that, for
the defense to succeed, the owner not only had to be "uninvolved and
unaware of" the illegal activity, but also had to have "done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property."'47
Innocent owners may have difficulty meeting such burdens. Would
Sarah have to kick her young son out of the house or spy on him for the
police? If Dan were Sarah's tenant, would she have to evict him?
Addressing the latter query, New York City's Housing Code has particular
sections dedicated to evicting tenants involved with drugs." Actions
such as these, however, are available only on the recommendation of the
prosecutor. Indeed, because Sarah did not cooperate with police, she is
unlikely to win the prosecutor's recommendation to avoid having her
house seized. Therefore, the innocent owner defense does not sufficiently
protect against seizures by way of overbroad forfeiture statutes.
C. How Courts Justify the Overbreadth of Forfeiture Statutes
1. Precedent
Rather than taking a fresh look at whether modem forfeiture statutes
accord with generally applicable principles of the Constitution, courts base
their justification of forfeitures primarily on precedent. As early as 1920,
46. See United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cu. 1990) (per
curiam) (holding that a § 881(a)(7) claimant's knowledge of the illegal activity
disqualified him from relying on the lack of consent provision of the innocent owner
defense). But see United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y.
1989) (analyzing § 881(a)(7) to be read in the disjunctive and thus allowing the owner
to employ the defense if he can show either absence of knowledge or absence of
consent).
47. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689 (footnote omitted). The Court also recognized
that when an owner neither has knowledge nor consents and does everything to avoid the
illicit use, "it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and
was not unduly oppressive." Id. at 689-90.
48. N.Y. REAL PROP. Acrs. LAW'; §§ 711(5), 715 (McKinney 1994).
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the Supreme Court stated that forfeiture actions are "too firmly fixed in
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced." 49 Unfortunately, the precedent rested upon rickety support:
a group of early cases that upheld forfeitures of ships and their cargoes
involved in violations of customs laws.'
These early smuggling cases provide weak justification for modem
forfeiture statutes. Although these cases found that the property was
guilty rather than the property's owner, the Court nevertheless understood
that it is the ship's crew and not the ship itself who committed the
crime.5 1 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that it is fair to penalize the
shipowner for the crew's acts because, working backwards, the ship is
operated by the crew; the crew is commanded by the master; and the
master is chosen and hired by the owner.52 However, such reasoning
does not support modem forfeiture practice because its premise is that the
non-criminal owner has the means available to stop the crime. This
premise made sense in the early smuggling cases. In those cases, the
ship's master was not just an employee of the owner, but frequently a
partner, joint venturer, or at the least an agent of the owner-an alter ego
rather than an employee."
In fact, the master ruled with a whip.
Today, on the other hand, because of social norms and legal constraints,
property owners lack such control over their children, relatives,
employees, tenants, and guests-any one of whom, by their actions, could
subject the property to civil forfeiture.
Despite such lack of control, respondeat superior has been used to
justify the -seizure of property under forfeiture statutes.'
However,
49. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1920)
(citing Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401-02 (1877)).
50. See George Fishman, Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform: The Agenda Before
Congress, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 121,121-23 (1994); see also The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); Dobbins'sDistillery, 96 U.S. 395.
51. Dobbins'sDistillery, 96 U.S. at 401 (stating that, in the typical case, the owner
of a ship "impliedly submits to whatever the law denounces as a forfeiture attached to
the ship by means of [the crew's] unlawful or wanton misconduct").
52. United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.D. Va. 1818) (No.
15,612).
53. See The Schooner Freeman v. Buckingham, 59 U.S. 182 (1855) (recognizing
this role of a ship's master). See generally Daniel E. Murray, History andDevelopment
of the Bill of Lading, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 689, 692-93 (1983) (discussing the
relationship between ship master and owner).
54. See, e.g., Harris v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 500 So. 2d 958, 963
(Miss. 1987) (stating that under certain circumstances respondeatsuperiorcan apply to
civil forfeiture proceedings). See generally Vann v. District of Columbia Bd. of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers, 480 A.2d 688 (D.C. 1984); Davis v. Missouri Real Estate
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forfeiture involves considerations unlike those in tort where the respondeat

superiortheory is used. In tort, the choice is whether the employer or the
victim shall suffer the loss. In contrast, the purpose of forfeiture is not

to allocate risk as in tort. Rather, its purpose is to punish."5
Perhaps recognizing that the analogy between forfeiture and

respondeatsuperiorin tort is weak, the Supreme Court in Austin v. United
States identified that, in early forfeiture cases, the forfeiture was justified
by the owner's negligence in failing to prevent the crime.'
In his

concurrence, however, Justice Scalia disagreed that negligence is
pervasively discernible in the cases upholding forfeiture. 7 In fact, he
argued, the issue of whether negligence is constitutionally required has
always been reserved for future decision.5" Further, justifying forfeiture

by the owner's negligence is wrong for a far more fundamental reason:
culpability is not an element of forfeiture statutes and the government,
therefore, does not have to prove it as an element of the crime."

As a result, forfeiture defendants inappropriately become strictly liable
for failure to prevent crimes connected in some loose sense to their
property. The government had a far stronger justification for imposing
strict liability in the early smuggling cases-protecting America's

borders-than it does in the more common sorts of modem forfeiture.
When protecting our borders, the government's powers are particularly
great.' This is because entry of a ship and cargo into this country is
arguably a privilege that could be denied. It could also be conditioned

upon a duty to refrain from customs violations at the peril of having the
ship and cargo forfeited. This line of reasoning cannot, however, impose
a strict duty, and thus strict liability, upon owners of real or personal
property within our borders in order to prevent crime. First, the
Comm'n, 211 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948).
55. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (stating that
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7) constitutes punishment); Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See generallyJ.W. Goldsmith, Jr.Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1920) (discussing the position of
forfeiture in punitive and remedial jurisprudence).
56. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2807.
57. See id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
("We have never held that the Constitution requires negligence, or any other degree of
culpability, to support such forfeitures.").
58. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
59. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214,218, reh'gdenied, 481 F.2d
1404 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974) (stating that, unlike other
searches which require probable cause, border searches require only a reasonable
suspicion that customs laws are being violated); 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1988).
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Constitution provides procedural safeguards to limit the government's
ability to seize property. 6 Second, while the ship owner's affirmative
duty arises at the time of entry into the country, the property owner's duty
exists at all times. The strict duty to prevent crime, in effect, drafts the
property owner into the police force involuntarily and without pay. The
police did precisely this to Sarah.
Finally, even if Congress or state legislatures have the power to
impose strict liability on property owners like Sarah for failure to prevent
crime, it is doubtful that they have intended to do so. No forfeiture
statute speaks explicitly of a duty to prevent crime. Legislators probably
did not consider imposing any such duty because it would be highly
unpopular with their constituents. Moreover, even if forfeiture statutes
could be construed to include such a duty, they should be interpreted more
narrowly for at least two reasons. First, courts disfavor interpretations
that unnecessarily raise constitutional issues. Second, courts generally
reason that legislators will speak explicitly and clearly when they intend
a radical departure from current expectations and traditions of duties to
prevent crimes. Therefore, because case law decisions are justified by
outdated forfeiture purposes, today's courts should reevaluate today's
forfeiture laws in light of today's purposes.
2. Public Purpose
The Supreme Court has sometimes tried to justify forfeiture of the
property of innocent owners on the basis that it serves an important public
purpose. In J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,62 while
searching for further justification of forfeiture statutes, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to raise revenues and fashion domestic
policy.' In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,64 the Court
articulated public policy, stating that "forfeiture of conveyances that have
been used-and may be used again-in violation of the narcotics laws
fosters the purposes served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by
preventing further illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an
economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."'
61. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V ("No person shall... be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... ."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[Nor shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .....
62. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
63. Id. at 510.
64. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
65. Id. at 686-87.
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However, public purpose justifies a taking with just compensation, not
without.
More fundamentally, punishment without proof of wrongdoing violates
the due process protection of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
recently expanded the due process protection afforded owners of property
in civil forfeiture cases. In United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Propeny,6 the Court said that, but for "'extraordinary situations where
some valid government interest is at stake,'" a pre-seizure hearing is
required before the government can seize real property.67 Following this
expansion of due process rights, the Court's next step should be to require
the government to prove criminal wrongdoing on the part of the property
owner.
Although courts use questionable reasoning to justify civil forfeiture
statutes, they leave open the possibility that such statutes may authorize
forfeitures that are takings.' But, instead of considering whether the
statutes are overbroad on their face, courts decide takings challenges on
an ad hoc, case-by-case method.'
D. The Excessive Fines Clause
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to civil forfeitures as well as criminal forfeitures.7
In Austin, the government seized Austin's mobile home and auto body
shop pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (7).71 By seeking forfeiture,
the government contended that the seizure of Austin's property was
remedial rather than punitive in nature,7 and therefore not limited by the
Excessive Fines Clause.
The defendant argued that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines was not limited to
criminal proceedings.' 3 The Court determined that this forfeiture was
66. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
67. Id. at 501 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)); see also Mary
M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, andProfitableAlso Be Fair?Runaway Civil
Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1, 34-36 (1994).
68. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663.

69. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
70. See Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); Alexander v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
71. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
72. id. at 2804-05.
73. Id. at 2805-06; see also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 267-77 (1989) (detailing the history of the Excessive Fines Clause
and noting that it was intended to prevent the government from abusing its power to
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punitive as opposed to remedial and accordingly was subject to the
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause and that the government's
contention that the forfeiture was remedial was unsupported.74
Consequently, the Court remanded the case to determine whether the
seizure of Austin's property was excessive.'
Similarly, in Alexander v. United States, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the district court's decision ordering petitioner to forfeit his
entire business and almost $9 million acquired through illegal racketeering
activity.76 The Court held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and
the Excessive Fines clauses must be considered independently of each
other.' The Court was concerned that the criminal forfeiture at issue
was a monetary punishment within the traditional definition of the word
"fine.""8 Accordingly, the Court stated that the forfeiture should have
been analyzed under both the Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual
Punishments clauses." By failing to expressly analyze the penalty under
each clause, the lower court may have improperly determined whether the
forfeiture was excessive." As in Austin, the Court emphasized that
historical interpretation and legislative intent require that the seizure of
Alexander's property be explicitly analyzed from the standpoint of the
Excessive Fines Clause as well as the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause."1
However, despite Austin and Alexander, the Supreme Court has given
lower courts little guidance as to the precise criteria applicable to an
Eighth Amendment analysis. Presently, the limits placed on forfeiture by
punish, and noting that in a historical context, the word "fine" was understood to mean
punishment).
74. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that
the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, combined with the focus of the
statute on the "culpability of the owner, and the evidence that Congress understood [the
statute's] provisions as serving to deter and to punish," does not support the
government's assertion that forfeiture is solely remedial in nature. Id.
75. Id. (directing the Second Circuit to determine if the forfeiture of Austin's
property, which had non-criminal uses and was only incidentally involved in the crime,
was excessive).
76. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2770 (1993).
77. Id. at 2775.
78. Id. at 2775-76.
79. Id. at 2776.
80. Id. at 2775-76 (finding that the district court "lumped the two [clauses]
together" and, therefore, in a general statement concerning Eighth Amendment
prohibitions, did not expressly resolve the question of whether the Excessive Fines
Clause was violated).
81. See id.
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the Excessive Fines Clause are determined ad hoc. As has been
demonstrated, statutes authorize forfeiture in a wide variety of
circumstances that cannot be reconciled with the Takings or the Excessive
Fines clauses. As a result, the government's forfeiture power is restricted
only by the Constitution and each court's ad hoc interpretation of those
clauses; not by the language of the forfeiture statutes.
III. CIVIL FORFErrURE STATUTES ARE VOID FOR VAGUENESS
We now consider whether, as a consequence of the overbroad nature
of civil forfeiture, those statutes are unconstitutionally vague. Under the
"void-for-vagueness" rubric, the Supreme Court has held that vague penal
statutes violate the Due Process Clause.' We first examine whether civil
forfeiture statutes meet the Court's vagueness standard and, second,
examine whether the supposedly civil nature of civil forfeiture insulates
these statutes from void-for-vagueness scrutiny.
A. Civil Forfeiture Statutes Fail the Vagueness Test
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it does not define the offense
with sufficient precision to give ordinary people notice of the prohibited
conduct and provide adequate guidance to law enforcement personnel in
order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.?3
1. Notice
To provide adequate notice, statutory language must not be "'so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application ... .' A typical forfeiture statute describes
forfeitable assets as "[a]ll real property ...which is used, or intended to
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subehapter .... "' The phrase "to facilitate the
82. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (loitering statute); Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (U.S. flag misuse statute).

83. See, e.g., Graynedv. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) ("[We must insist
that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what
is prohibited [and] provide explicit standards for those who apply them."); see also
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982); Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385 (1926); LAwRENC E H. TRiBE, CoNnOriroNAL CHOICES 382 n.67 (1985)
(discussing the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
84. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 572 n.8 (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. at 391).
85. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
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commission of" is ambiguous. It provides little information about the
degree of connection required between the asset sought for forfeiture and
the violation. Indeed, courts are split on the very question of whether the
government must show a "substantial connection " ' or simply something
more than an "incidental or fortuitous connection"' to the criminal
activity. Moreover, "substantial" is itself an ambiguous and highly
malleable standard. For example, is the use of Sarah's front steps as a
lookout post considered substantial? If so, can the entire house be
declared forfeit or just the steps?
This vagueness in the statute's terms is compounded by the
overbreadth in the statute. This means that often the only effective limit
on forfeiture is the constitutional limitations on takings or excessive fines.
Courts are in frequent dispute over the reach of these limitations. In
addition, these limitations are even more of a puzzle to ordinary people,
such as Sarah. Indeed, scholarship about civil forfeiture describes many
cases of owners who had no reasonable means of suspecting that their

property might be subject to forfeiture.88 Therefore, forfeiture statutes

fail the notice requirement of the void-for-vagueness test and are
unconstitutional.
86. See United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1440 (11th
Cir. 1991) (stating that probable cause for belief of a substantial connection to drug
dealing is required under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6)); United States v. 28 Emery St., 914
F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that a substantial connection is required between the
property forfeited and the illegal drug transaction); United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d
987, 989-90 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding a substantial connection is required although that
does not mean that the property is indispensable to the commission of the crime).
87. See United States v. 785 St. Nicholas Ave. and 789 St. Nicholas Ave., 983 F.2d
396, 403 (2d Cir.) (stating that there need not be a substantial connection between the
crime and the property in question, only a nexus), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2349 (1993);
United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
"substantial connection" between the property and the related offense is not necessary
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991); United States v.
Lewis, 987 F.2d 1349, 1356 (8th Cir. 1993)). But see Schi'erli, 895 F.2d at 989-90
(finding that under the substantial connection test, "the property either must be used or
intended to be used to commit a crime, or must facilitate the commission of a crime" and
that an "incidental or fortuitous connection will not suffice.").
88. See, e.g., DAVID B. SMrTH, PROSECUTIONAND DEFENSE OF FORFErURE CASES
§ 1.02, at 1-21 to 1-24 (1994) (detailing newspaper articles of particularly egregious
forfeiture actions); Carol M. Bast, The Plight ofthe Minority Motorist, 39 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 49 (1994) (discussing numerous examples).
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2. Guidance in Enforcement
Forfeiture statutes also fail to provide sufficient guidance to ensure
non-arbitrary law enforcement.' The Supreme Court has recognized this
lack of guidance as the more important aspect of the vagueness
doctrine,' because without guidelines, a "statute may permit 'a
standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to
pursue their personal predilections.'" 9'
When looking for minimum guidelines, courts consider whether
enforcement depends on a completely subjective standard, such as the
standard of annoyance that was held impermissibly vague in Coates v. City
of Cincinnati.2 The Coates ordinance punished the sidewalk assembly
of three or more persons who "'conduct[ed] themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by . . . . '"' The Court concluded that
because no standard of conduct was specified in the statute "men of
89. The vagueness doctrine serves not only to ensure adequate notice and discourage
unfair enforcement, but also to guarantee that the penal laws of our society are made by
legislators, presidents, and governors rather than appointed officials and juries who are
not accountable through elections. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). As the
Court has stated, vague statutes allow enforcement officials to cast a "'net large enough
to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to . . . say who could be
rightfully detained . . . . This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the

legislative department of government.'" Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.7
(1983) (quoting United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876)). In this sense,
forfeitures necessarily involve the "rule of law" rationale underlying the void-forvagueness doctrine. The concept is "closely allied to the 'standardless' delegation
argument that Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking power to either the executive or
the judicial branch, unless it provides sufficient guidance as to the limited exercise of that
power." George C. Freeman, Jr. & Kyle E. McSlarrow, RICO and the Due Process
"Voidfor Vagueness" Test, 45 Bus. LAW. 1003, 1010 (1990) (footnote omitted). Under
this theory, civil forfeiture is not only void because it is unconstitutionally vague but also
because it is a standardless delegation of legislative power. Id. On the relationship
between delegation and void-for-vagueness, see DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WrITOUT
RESPoNSm-trrY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 42 n.65,

45 (1993).
90. See Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574 (noting that the more important concern of the
vagueness doctrine is "the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement").
91. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575).
92. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
93. Id. at 611 n.1 (quoting the relevant Cincinnati ordinance).
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common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. "I When the
statutory language "permits such selective law enforcement, there is a
denial of due process." 95
The ambiguities in civil forfeiture statutes, and in the constitutional
provisions that provide their outer limits, result in inadequate guidance for
law enforcement personnel. The right not to be punished without proof
of wrongdoing-which is arguably violated by forfeiture statutes-is
analogous to the right not to have your liberty restricted without having
violated a clear rule of conduct. This is the case with vagrancy statutes
which courts routinely strike down as being unconstitutionally vague.'
In both instances, the danger of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement
exists.
The danger is real. Accounts of forfeiture practice contain many
examples of prosecutors using forfeiture for improper purposes, such as
coercing cooperation and simply raising revenue.'
The danger of
selective enforcement is compounded because owners have to pay
attorneys' fees to defend their property regardless of their financial
resources, due to the civil nature of the proceedings. 1" Given the
94. Id. at 614 (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
95. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 576.
96. E.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1982); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971); United States ex rel. Newsomev. Malcolm, 492 F.2d
1166 (2d Cir. 1974).
97. Note the difference between statutory vagueness and constitutional vagueness.
A statute failing to give adequate guidance in enforcement or notice of the offense is
statutorily vague; a statute that is enforceable to the extent of the Constitution is
constitutionally vague because constitutional limits are often undetermined. Of course
a statute can be either statutorily or constitutionally vague, or both. In the case of
forfeiture statutes there is amplevagueness in the actual languageof the statutes to render
them statutorily vague as well as unconstitutionally vague.
98. See Richard Miniter, ill-Gotten Gains, REAsON, Aug.-Sept. 1993, at 32, 34.
99. See supra note 5.
100. Indeed, how can a defendant whose assets have been restrained afford to pay
counsel at the hearing? See Bast, supranote 88 (describing legislation seeking to provide
claimants with counsel). See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(holding that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to counsel but failing to define
what the term "indigent" means); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir.
1991) (finding that defendants who are subjected to pre-trial seizure are entitled to a
hearing where the prosecution must show evidence independent of the indictment to
justify forfeiture but noting that no hearing is required before a temporary restraining
order is issued becausethe purpose of forfeiture is to surprise the defendant and prevent
the disposition of the assets seized), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 382 (1991).
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uncertainty of success in such litigation, a cash-poor owner often cannot
borrow against the seized asset to finance efforts to reclaim it.101
3. Other Factors in the Vagueness Test
In addition to the two general concerns of notice and adequate
guidance, courts generally look to a collection of other factors in
determining whether to strike down a statute as unconstitutionally vague.
Factors that weigh in favor of finding a statute vague include: that the
violation described in the statute is one of omission rather than one of
commission; that punishment requires no finding of mens rea; that the
statute treads on a constitutionally protected freedom; that the legislature
could have written a more precise statute; and that the statute determines
whether any punishment is deserved, not merely the severity of the
punishment.
Each of these factors often is present in civil forfeiture
1
cases.

02

a. Sins of Omission
Courts scrutinize statutes criminalizing acts of omission-for example,
a felon's failure to register with the police'03 or a person's failure to
produce credible and reliable identification on demandl°"-more closely
than statutes criminalizing acts of commission when applying the
vagueness doctrine. 1
As in Sarah's case, civil forfeiture statutes
frequently punish acts of omission such as failure to stop a crime or
failure to keep property from being used in criminal acts. When forfeiture
statutes are used to punish acts of omission, courts are more likely to
examine them closely and to hold them unconstitutionally vague.
101. In addition, the government can even seize the money needed to hire an
attorney under these statutes without a violation of the property owner's right to counsel.
See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989); Monsanto, 924 F.2d
1186.
102. See infra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225,229 (1957) (requiring a closer
examination of a felon's failure to register with the police than the statute had provided).
104. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (viewing with care a
person's failure to produce credible and reliable identification on demand).
105. See LAURENCEH. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONST1TUTIONALLAW § 12-31, at 1033

n.3 (1988).
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b. Lack of Mens Rea
In contrast, courts are less apt to strike down statutes that contain a
mens rea element.'
However, civil forfeiture statutes do not contain
a mens rea element.'
Even if there is a mens rea element required by
the underlying crime which predicates the forfeiture, it does not save the
forfeiture statute from the likelihood that it will be deemed vague; the

statute itself still lacks the mens rea requirement that the owner had evil
intent.
c. Constitutionally Protected Rights
Courts are particularly concerned about vagueness in statutes that
tread on fundamental rights."l ~ Under the vagueness doctrine, courts
have invalidated statutes that have a chilling effect on the exercise of

constitutional rights such as the right to assemble, 1" and the right to

privacy. 1

Similarly, vague civil forfeiture statutes jeopardize two

fundamental rights: the right not to be punished without due process of
law and the right against having property taken

compensation.'

without just

Potential violation of these rights should weigh in

favor of invalidating civil forfeiture statutes.
106. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945) (stating that the mens
rea element removes the claim that the statute "punishes without warning [of] an offense
of which the accused was unaware"); see also Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982) (recognizing that a scienter requirement may mitigate
a statute's vagueness, especially regarding adequacy of notice).
107. While many statutes do include a "knowledge" element in the innocent owner
affirmative defense, this is not an element that the state must prove to successfully seize
property. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988); supranotes 37-69 and accompanying text.
108. See JOHN E. NowAK & RoNALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONALLAW § 16.9,
at 950 (4th ed. 1991).
109. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971) (invalidating
a loitering statute because it regulated in a vague manner the right to assemble and
punished constitutionally protected behavior).
110. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidating an abortion
regulation which, by conditioning possible criminal liability on vague criteria, had a
chilling effect on the exercise of the constitutional right to privacy).
111. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."); U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("[no] State [shall] deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
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d. Feasibility of Writing a More Precise Statute
In a void for vagueness analysis, courts prefer statutes that are
narrowly tailored and clearly written.

Such statutes are more likely to

reflect the considered judgment of the legislature. 12

Thus, one may

infer that courts are more willing to find a statute vague if Congress could

have written it more precisely. Unlike the statute in United States v.
Petrillo,"3 in which the language was sufficiently precise to stand
against a vagueness challenge," 4 the language of most civil forfeiture
statutes could be more precise. For example, the statute could limit
forfeiture to contraband, other property that has no non-contrived
legitimate use, fruits of the crime, and property that the owner has
acquired for the purpose of committing a crime or which he has used to

commit a crime. The feasibility of more precise alternatives should weigh
in favor of finding forfeiture statutes unconstitutionally vague.
e. Statutes That Determine Whether Any Punishment Is Justified

Another relevant factor in the vagueness test is whether the challenged
statute simply determines the severity of the punishment or whether the

statute determines if punishment is even justified.1 I

The premise

underlying this idea is that the consequences of a guilty person receiving

too severe a penalty is less disturbing than the consequence of punishing
an innocent person. Because civil forfeiture statutes fail into the latter
category-determining whether the property owner will keep or lose his
property-a high degree of specificity within the statute is required.
There is also a need for greater specificity in civil forfeiture statutes
because they are not criminal statutes, and thus, do not have the benefit
112. TRIBE, supranote 105, § 12-31, at 1034.
113. 332 U.S. 1 (1947). The statute provided for fines and imprisonment for those
convicted of threatening a radio-broadcasting licensee to employ persons "in excess of
the number of persons needed by such licensee to perform actual services." Pub. L. No.
344, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89 (1946) (amending the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652,
48 Stat. 1064). The statute, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 506, was repealed in 1980. Pub.
L. No. 96-507, 94 Stat. 2747 (1980).
114. Petrillo, 332 U.S. at 7 (upholding the statute because, although "[c]learer
andmoreprecise language might have been framed by Congress to express what it meant
... none occurs to us, nor has any better language been suggested, effectively to carry
out what appears to have been the Congressional purpose").
115. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985).
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of the constitutional safeguards provided in the criminal context. 1 6
Because the risk of arbitrary punishment is higher under civil forfeiture
statutes than under criminal statutes, civil forfeiture statutes require a
higher degree of scrutiny.
All of these factors that instruct the courts' application of the
vagueness doctrine weigh in favor of finding civil forfeiture statutes void
for vagueness.
B. The Void-for-Vagueness DoctrineApplies
to Civil Penal Statutes
Although most statutes held unconstitutionally vague are criminal in
nature, the supposedly "civil" nature of civil forfeiture statues does not
insulate them from void-for-vagueness scrutiny. Courts have applied the
void-for-vagueness analysis to civil statutes that have penal purposes."'
In Austin, the Supreme Court held that civil forfeiture is punishment.118
It follows
from this that civil forfeiture statutes are subject to vagueness
11 9
scrutiny.

This conclusion is not only a logical deduction from the cases, but
also makes good sense because civil forfeiture not only punishes, but
116. See, e.g. Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-57 (1968) (holding that the
intent of the Framers, combined with historical considerations through the late 18th
Century, dictate that the right to trial by jury is granted to criminal defendants in order
to prevent government oppression and overzealousjudges and prosecutors); see also U.S.
CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3, which states:
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have becn previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
117. See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, reh'g denied, 341 U.S. 956
(1951) (applying vagueness scrutiny to statute relating to the deportation of aliens);
Stallone v. Abrams, 584 N.Y.S.2d 535 (App. Div. 1992) (applying vagueness test to
public health statute's provision for forfeiture of equipment used in dispensing or
administering controlled substances).
118. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
119. See Stallone, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 536.
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punishes severely.'" The punishment is on account of the commission
of a crime. As such, the purposes of the void-for-vagueness doctrine are
fully applicable to civil forfeiture. 12 ' Indeed, modem forfeiture practice
provides many examples of forfeitures carried out against owners who had
no fair notice of the legal risks to which they were exposed, and of unfair
or self-interested conduct by police and prosecutors.'2
Moreover, in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property,m

the Supreme Court applied the notice and hearing requirements to civil
forfeitures, holding that due process required them." In this vein, it
is clearly appropriate for another due process protection-that is, void for
vagueness-to apply to civil forfeiture.
IV. CONCLUSION

The courts should strike down typical civil forfeiture statutes as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The problems of overbreadth and
vagueness would be cured. If the current statutes were amended,

legislatures would have to confront the severe criticisms of current
forfeiture practice from all sides of the political spectrum.

Law

enforcement officials would have to answer politically for their abuses of
power. Finally, in having to draft without platitudes such as "facilitation"

and "substantial," legislators will have to take responsibility for defining
precisely which categories of property owned by innocent owners are
subject to forfeiture. That ought to get the attention of their constituents.
120. Jordan, 341 U.S. at 223 (severity of civil punishment is reason to scrutinize
for vagueness).
121. See Freeman & McSlarrow, supranote 89, at 1006 (noting that the vagueness
doctrine applies in both civil and criminal contexts).
122. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492,
504-05 (1993) (holding that absent exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause
requires notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of claimant's real property because of
the punitive intent of the statute directed at those involved in a criminal enterprise);
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 690 (1974) (noting that
allegation or proof that the claimant did all that it reasonably could do to avoid having
its property unlawfully used would allow a court to examine the unduly oppressive nature
of forfeiture proceedings and find the seizure unlawful); accord Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (holding that the goal of deterrence cannot be realized unless the
exclusionary rule is applied in civil forfeiture proceedings); In re Kingsley, 614 F. Supp.
219, 222-23 (D. Mass. 1985) (finding that seizure of petitioner's property was not
effected incident to the execution of a valid warrant), appealdismissed, 802 F.2d 571
(1st Cir. 1986); see also Heilbroner, supra note 5.
123. 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
124. Id. at 505.

